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Abstract 
Recently, the English courts have had to make determinations in a number high-profile, 
emotive disputes over the care of very ill children, including Charlie Gard, Alfie Evans, and 
Tafida Raqeeb. It is perhaps fair to say such cases have become a regular feature of the courts 
in England. But is the situation similar in other jurisdictions? If not, are there lessons to be 
learned from these jurisdictions that do not seem to need to call on judges to resolve these 
otherwise intractable disputes? We argue that many of the differences we see between 
jurisdictions derive from cultural and social differences manifesting in both the legal rules in 
place, and how the various parties interact with, and defer to, one another. We further argue 
that while recourse to the courts is undesirable in many ways, it is also indicative of a society 
that permits difference of views and provides for these differences to be considered in an public 
manner following clear procedural and precedential rules. These are the hallmarks of a liberal 
democracy that allows for pluralism of values, while still remaining committed to protecting 
the most vulnerable parties in these disputes – children facing life-limiting conditions. While 
we may lament the painful playing out of a parent’s worst nightmare in the courts, we should 
also see the value in enabling parents and hospitals this recourse because the alternative, we 
argue, is worse. 
Keywords 
• Best interests 
• Children 
• Decision-making 
• Life-sustaining treatment 
• Parental rights 
• Comparative analysis 
 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, the English courts have been called upon to determine a number of 
high-profile and emotive cases involving disputes over what care should be given to a very ill 
child. The cases of Charlie Gard,1 Alfie Evans,2 Isaiah Haastrup3 and Tafida Raqeeb4 are well-
known, having attracted considerable attention in the media and within the community 
generally, marked by acrimonious disagreement over who should have the final say in 
decisions about a child’s medical treatment. Given that such cases have, it is perhaps fair to 
say, become a regular feature of the courts in England, we might imagine that other 
jurisdictions have had a similar experience, with disputes between parents and doctors likewise 
failing to find resolution without recourse to the legal system. We might think that this is simply 
a feature of such emotionally-charged and polarising disputes and that most if not all 
jurisdictions face similar challenges as our courts have in dealing with these situations. This, 
however, appears not to be the case. In fact, the English experience is arguably atypical, and 
for the most part, disputes of this kind in other jurisdictions do not give rise to the levels of 
complex, distressing litigation that we see in this country. Given this, we might wonder what 
other jurisdictions are doing in similar situations and whether there is anything we can learn to 
avoid such situations continuing to come before the courts in the future. This is the question 
we explore in this paper.  
We came to this view of England and Wales as an outlier in the wake of producing (with 
Jonathan Herring), our edited volume, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young Children: 
A Comparative Perspective.5 In that collection, we brought together reports on decision-
making from a wide range of jurisdictions, looking at both the law and practice on parent/doctor 
disputes over the care of ill children. One clear difference that emerged from these reports was 
a difference in how often, if at all, disputes about the care of children end up being resolved in 
the courts. Across almost 30 jurisdictions covered in the collection, disagreements appeared to 
 
1 The case involving Charlie Gard is officially Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates and Gard [2017] EWHC 
972 (Fam), [2017] 4 W.L.U.K. 260 and so we refer to it as “Gard” when referring to the decision and the litigation.  
2 Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust v Mr. Thomas Evans, Ms Kate James, Alfie Evans (A Child by his 
Guardian CAFCASS Legal) [2018] EWHC 308 (Fam), [2018] 2 F.L.R. 1223.  
3 Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Ms Thomas, Mr. Haastrup and Isaiah Haastrup [2018] EWHC 
127 (Fam), [2018] 2 F.L.R. 1028.  
4 Raqeeb v Barts NHS Foundation Trust & Anors [2019] EWHC 2531 (Admin). 
5 I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young Children: A Comparative 
Perspective (forthcoming, Hart Publishing).  
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end up being judicially resolved much more frequently in this country than in most other 
jurisdictions.6  
In this paper, we therefore begin by explaining the background and findings of the collection, 
before going on to consider how, if at all, the English system might benefit from emulating the 
approach in other jurisdictions. To answer this, we must first understand why levels of litigation 
are lower in other countries, and we posit a number of possible explanations for this. We argue 
firstly that in many countries, one party (parents or medics), is afforded much more authority 
to make definitive decisions about a child’s care. This has implications for how disputes are 
managed in practice, as well as being reflected in the legal frameworks in place (or, indeed, not 
in place). Second, and relatedly, we suggest that litigation levels may be explained by different 
approaches to conflict, which are partly culturally or socially determined. Third, drawing these 
points together, we demonstrate how they often result in jurisdictions employing different 
mechanisms for addressing disputes which do not require the involvement of the court.  
With this analysis in place, we then explore whether we might benefit from emulating some 
aspects of the practice of other jurisdictions in England and Wales. We argue that while there 
are lessons we might learn, in many ways the differences in approach appear to arise because 
of different cultural perspectives on how disputes should be resolved, and that there are good 
reasons not to share those perspectives in this country. One reason for this is simply structural 
and procedural — it would be very difficult for the English system to reform itself to adopt that 
seen in a number of African jurisdictions, for example, where the goal is harmonious, 
communal decision-making. More importantly, however, the level of disagreement that has 
been seen in disputes of this kind is a reflection of the multicultural, multi-faith society that is 
modern England. If we accept (as we believe we should) that we should respect differences of 
value and belief, then it follows that we will not all always agree about what is ‘best’ in complex 
medical situations, where a balance might need to be struck between preserving life and 
ensuring a minimally acceptable quality of life, and where views about what risks are worth 
taking at what costs, may differ. When we do not agree, intractable disputes about care will 
arise. That we see these openly, if acrimoniously debated in this country, is precisely because 
ours is a society in which such open debate is permitted. The real question we need to focus on 
is how we can navigate those disputes to arrive at supportable decisions that adequately protect 
 
6 The United States and Australia were also outliers. 
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children from harm while still leaving room for value difference. We briefly examine some 
alternative mechanisms for resolving disputes, such as clinical ethics committees and 
mediation, the latter being of particular interest given the Bill currently before Parliament 
which would require health authorities to attempt mediation before they could apply to the 
courts for resolution. We conclude, however, that courts remain the best final arbiters in 
difficult cases, albeit that to respect the value-plural nature of our society and its implications 
for the ‘best interests’ approach, the courts ought to be more overt about the values to which 
they are committed, to allow open debate about these.   
II. CREATING THE COLLECTION: EXAMINING THE EXPERIENCES 
OF OTHER COUNTRIES  
When we began writing about conflicts between parents and medical professionals, our focus 
was on the English law’s approach to such disputes. But as the international media’s interest 
in Charlie Gard and subsequent cases grew, one interesting dimension to their response was a 
widespread belief that the families would have had a different experience had they been in 
other countries.7 In the United States, for example, it was often felt that greater deference was 
accorded to parental choice for libertarian reasons, with the tragic case of Jahi McMath raised 
in support. The structure of the medical industry, especially when compared to the ‘despotic 
hospital system’ of England,8 also meant that if a patient has the insurance to pay for a 
treatment, it would generally be given. This prompted us to think about whether the approach 
in other jurisdictions was similar, and if not, whether these differences could be instructive 
about how the English approach might be improved, or perhaps vice versa. To explore this, we 
sought out scholars from Europe, North and South America, Africa, Asia and Australasia, to 
produce a collection covering nearly 30 jurisdictions from six continents, on which this paper 
draws. 
 
7 See, for example, S. Scutti, ‘Could Charlie Gard’s case happen in the United States?’ CNN (6th July 2017) 
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/06/health/charlie-gard-us-laws/index.html; S. Scott and R. Armitage, ‘Charlie 
Gard: Could a personal and legal tragedy of a terminally ill baby happen in Australia?’ ABC News (24th July 
2017) https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-24/could-a-charlie-gard-case-happen-in-australia/8735900; W.J. 
Smith, ‘Charlie Gard Has Happened Here Too’ National Review (4th July 2017) 
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/charlie-gard-has-happened-here-too/. 
8 See, for example, S. Foley, ‘Could an Alfie Evans case happen in the US?’ Relevant Radio (26th April 2018), 
available at < https://relevantradio.com/2018/04/could-an-alfie-evans-case-happen-in-the-united-states/> 
accessed 10th August 2019.  
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In putting together that collection, we had a second goal: we wanted not just to elucidate and 
learn from the approaches in other jurisdictions, but to contextualise the differences (and 
similarities) against the cultural and social values of other jurisdictions that might inform (and 
partly explain) them. We theorized that even though in all jurisdictions subject to the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), the fundamental principle remains 
the best interests of the child, the weight given to welfare varies from paramountcy to being ‘a’ 
primary consideration, and the responsibility of fulfilling the child’s best interests would often 
be distributed differently between parents, doctors and the courts. We therefore asked 
contributors to explain the normative foundations of their jurisdiction’s approach, and the 
values that inform both who has decision-making authority and how it is exercised. The results 
bear out our hypothesis, with the range of approaches evidencing that even when starting from 
very similar normative commitments, a legal system can, for numerous reasons, arrive at quite 
different ways of resolving conflicts. There is much we could say about the similarities and 
differences, but here we focus on one key point of comparison – the extent to which courts are 
called upon to resolve disputes. 
III. DO OTHER COUNTRIES ALSO HAVE NUMEROUS CASES 
COMING TO THE COURTS? 
Writing in a jurisdiction which has seen such regular, high-profile and highly fraught litigation 
on these issues, it was notable that in many of the jurisdictions examined in the collection, 
contributors reported a distinct lack of cases coming before the courts.9 While the Gard, Evans 
and Raqeeb cases are the most well-known disputes of this kind to arise recently in England, 
they are certainly not the only ones, and statistics published by the Children and Family Court 
Advisory and Support Service suggest that between 2015 and August 2019, at least 22 cases 
concerning the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment were decided by the courts.10 This is, of 
course, something both parents and hospitals seek to avoid, and most similar situations are 
 
9 Contributors from Greece, Hong Kong, Scotland, Botswana, Sweden and Ireland, amongst others, noted that is 
rare (in some cases almost to the point of no litigation at all) for such disputes to be taken before the courts.  
10 Response to a Freedom of Information request made to Cafcass, 21st January 2020.  
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dealt with by hospitals without ever requiring court resolution.11 It is clear however, that many, 
even if by no means the majority of such disputes, end up being resolved by the courts.  
In stark contrast, contributors from many jurisdictions — Greece, Hong Kong, Scotland, 
Botswana, Sweden, Norway and Ireland, amongst others — reported there were no similar 
recorded court cases of this kind, or very few.12 Some contributors suggested that disputes 
reaching the court was such a rare event that it was difficult to discern what would happen in a 
situation like that of Charlie Gard or Alfie Evans in their jurisdiction because the case law was 
so sparse (or non-existent), that there was no precedent on which to draw. Others suggested 
that given how infrequent such cases were, there were not even legal mechanisms for bringing 
such disputes before the court. For example, Admark Moyo reported that there are no 
legislative provisions that directly regulate parental consent to medical treatment of children in 
Botswana at all, which he suggests partly explains the scarcity of case law.13 Pernilla Leviner, 
writing on the Swedish approach, made similar observations, noting 
The simple answer to these questions is that we really do not know much more than the little 
anecdotal information that health care providers relate. No similar cases have been tried in a 
Swedish court and as will become clear in this chapter, it is also unlikely that such cases would 
be brought to court due to the lack of such mechanisms in our legal system.14 
While Sweden does have legal avenues by which at-risk children can be taken into care, 
Leviner reports that “this does not extend to a facility for medics to request intervention”. 
Doctors simply “do not have the opportunity to petition for the authority to decide on the 
medical care initiatives that are to be carried out or not”.15 Similarly in Thailand, even where 
doctors consider the parents’ decision does not serve the best interests of the child, “the doctor 
or the healthcare service provider does not have any legal standings to bring a case to the court 
 
11 See, for example, the results of Joe Brierley et al’s study, at n155.  
12 These views are supported in the wider literature, such as Norway: M. K. Bahus and R. Føerde, ‘Parents As 
Decision-Makers — Do the Attitudes of Norwegian Doctors Conform to Law?’ (2011) European Journal of 
Health Law 18 531-547. 
13 A Moyo, ‘Parental Responsibility and Medical Decision-Making in Southern Africa: A Comparative Analysis 
of the Laws Governing Parental Consent to Children’s Medical Treatment and Surgical Operations in South Africa 
and Botswana’ in I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young Children: 
A Comparative Perspective (forthcoming, Hart Publishing). 
14 P Leviner, ‘Who Has the Final Word? On Trust and Legal Uncertainty Within the Swedish Healthcare System’ 
in I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young Children: A Comparative 
Perspective (forthcoming, Hart Publishing). 
15 P Leviner, ‘Who Has the Final Word? On Trust and Legal Uncertainty Within the Swedish Healthcare System’ 
in I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young Children: A Comparative 
Perspective (forthcoming, Hart Publishing). 
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for judicial intervention of parental decisions”.16 In China meanwhile, Ding Chunyan explains 
that within Chinese procedural law, “a proper procedure is lacking that enables either doctors 
or other relevant parties to file an action to challenge the parents’ medical decision on behalf 
of children.”17 Nor is there the concept of ‘inherent jurisdiction’ and ‘wardship’, and so the 
courts there do not have jurisdiction to intervene in parental decisions regarding the medical 
care of children. It emerges, then, that not only is there a lack of case law on this issue in some 
countries, but a number of jurisdictions do not even have mechanisms in place for bringing 
such disputes before the courts. This is, of course, markedly different from the English system, 
which offers a clear pathway through which doctors can request judicial determination of 
whether a treatment is in the best interests of the child, whether under the inherent jurisdiction 
or via section 8 of the Children Act 1989. In fact, of the jurisdictions covered, only Australia 
and the United States appeared to have similar levels of judicial treatment of such conflicts;18 
a finding supported by a comparative analysis of the United States and English approaches to 
such cases by John Paris et al.19  
This raises the question of whether we could learn anything from the approaches of those 
jurisdictions where matters are rarely taken to court. Certainly there may be reason to think that 
avoiding the lengthy and highly-fraught litigation seen in England in recent years would be 
desirable. As Mike Linney et al describe in the Royal College of Child and Paediatric Health 
guidance, going to court is ‘time consuming and protracted with a profound psychological 
 
16 T Tenguamunauy, ‘Parental Authoritarianism and Medical Decision-Making in Thailand: The Need to Limit 
Parental Authority’ in I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young 
Children: A Comparative Perspective (forthcoming, Hart Publishing). 
17 D Chunyan, ‘Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Children in China: A Multidimensional Analysis of 
Parental Authoritarianism’ in I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young 
Children: A Comparative Perspective (forthcoming, Hart Publishing). 
18 See C. Stewart, ‘Children and Medical Decision-Making in Australia Post-Gard: A Possible Reformulation’ in 
I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young Children: A Comparative 
Perspective (forthcoming, Hart Publishing); L. Francis, J. Botkin and D. Diekema, ‘Decision-Making on Behalf 
of Children in the Research and Clinical Context: A US Perspective’ in I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, 
Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young Children: A Comparative Perspective (forthcoming, Hart 
Publishing). See further on the United States approach: J J Paris, J Ahluwalia, B M Cummings, M P Moreland, 
and D J Wilkinson, ‘The Charlie Gard case: British and American approaches to court resolution of disputes over 
medical decisions’ J Perinatol. 2017 Dec; 37(12): 1268–1271.  
19 J J Paris, J Ahluwalia, B M Cummings, M P Moreland, and D J Wilkinson, ‘The Charlie Gard case: British and 
American approaches to court resolution of disputes over medical decisions’ J Perinatol. 2017 Dec; 37(12): 1268–
1271. The Paris paper did not distinguish between the English and Welsh system and the Scottish courts as they 
ought to have done. By United Kingdom, they seem to mean the English and Welsh system as none of the cases 
cited are Scottish. We have also, in paraphrasing, assumed they mean common community in England as it seems 
problematic to elide Wales and England as a single, homogenous community. 
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impact on families and staff’.20 The English and Welsh court system is inherently adversarial, 
which necessarily means that one party must win, and the other lose. By agreeing with one 
party’s assessment of the child’s best interests over the others, judges implicitly send a message 
that one was right and the other wrong, which as Louise Austin and Richard Huxtable explain, 
‘is not necessarily an appropriate framing’ for an issue which is not black and white, but 
‘replete with ethical shades of grey’.21 Although attempts can be made to mitigate this, the 
losing party may, as Margaret Brazier observes, feel they have been offered little more than 
‘kind words’ from the judge.22 
Taking a matter to court may also serve to exacerbate, rather than diffuse, conflict.23 Simon 
Meller and Sarah Barclay for example, have suggested that it ‘tends to result in entrenchment 
and further escalation of already strongly held opinions’.24 Thomas Fassier and Elie Azoulay 
meanwhile, found that staff in ICU generally regarded litigation as an ‘inefficient’ means of 
resolving disputes which ‘may impair the grief process in the family members and amplify 
frustration among the ICU staff.’ 25  
There are also substantial costs involved in going to court — both financial and emotional. In 
the absence of legal aid, this financial burden may make applying to the courts prohibitively 
expensive for parents and in Gard, Mr Justice Frances made reference to the many parents 
around the country who ‘have had to struggle to represent themselves’ in such proceedings.26   
Absent a lawyer willing to work pro bono (or with a view to encouraging one to do so), some 
parents may turn to crowd funding to finance litigations, drawing even greater public attention 
to the dispute. This may have its own downsides, making it difficult for parents to change their 
position, even if circumstances change. The strength of feeling among some parts of Charlie 
and Alfie’s ‘Armies’ that the parents should not ‘back down’ or ‘stop fighting’ despite multiple 
 
20 M Linney, RDW Hain, D Wilkinson et al, ‘Achieving consensus advice for paediatricians and other health 
professionals: on prevention, recognition and management of conflict in paediatric practice’ (2019) Arch Dis 
Child 104:413-16. 
21 L. Austin and R. Huxtable, ‘Resoling Disagreements about the Care of Critically Ill Children’ in I. Goold, J. 
Herring and C. Auckland, Parental Rights, Best Interests and Significant Harms (Hart Publishing, 2019), 225.  
22 M Brazier, ‘An Intractable Dispute: When Parents and Professionals Disagree’ (2005) 13 Med L Rev 412, 417.  
23 G. Birchley and R. Huxtable, ‘Critical decisions for critically ill infants: principles, processes, problems’ in C. 
Stanton et al (eds), Pioneering Healthcare Law: Essays in honour of Margaret Brazier (2016), p122. 
24 S. Meller and S.Barclay  ‘Mediation: an approach to intractable disputes between parents and paediatricians’ 
(2011) Arch Dis Child 96:619–21 
25 T Fassier and E Azoulay, ’Conflicts and Communication Gaps in the Intensive Care Unit’ (2010) 16 Current 
Opinion in Critical Care 654, 662.  
26 Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates & anors [2017] EWHC 1909 (Fam), 17.  
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defeats in court is perhaps an illustration of this. Even for NHS Trusts who can afford the 
litigation meanwhile, long and complex court cases will inevitably take their toll on their 
budgets, taking resources away from primary care.  
The emotional cost to the parties may be even greater, with parents forced to watch their 
personal tragedy played out on the world’s stage, devoting considerable time and energy during 
the final moments of their child’s life to an often fruitless legal battle. Nor are healthcare 
professionals left unscathed by the process. As Greenberg and Weingarten have noted, forcing 
them to participate in integrity-compromising situations, where they must act in a way that is 
inconsistent with what they believe to be the ‘right or desired course of action’ can cause them 
to suffer emotional distress, decreasing their job satisfaction and leading them to withdraw 
from patients.27 Doctors may also fear the negative publicity that may result from a court battle. 
In the wake of Gard and Evans, which resulted in doctors being subject to abuse and even death 
threats,28 one can hardly blame them. 
Finally, these disputes are rarely short. As Jo Bridgeman explains, despite the Gard case being 
fast-tracked, it still lasted for five months29 and the Evans litigation was similar. During this 
time, healthcare professionals must continue to treat the child even if they do not consider it in 
the child’s best interests, and perhaps even harmful. This can have an affect not just on the 
child and the staff, but also on the care of other children. Despite reaching their fundraising 
target for Charlie’s treatment the day before the first High Court hearing was due to begin, for 
example, Charlie remained in intensive care for a further four months before treatment was 
withdrawn.30 The average stay in neonatal intensive care ordinarily is just seven days.31  
Given this, there are clear  reasons to avoid going to court where possible. It would therefore 
be valuable to understand how other jurisdictions manage to avoid this outcome. In the next 
 
27 RA Greenberg and K Weingarten, ‘When health care professionals say “more” and parents say “enough”’ 
Paediatr Child Health Vol 20 No 3 April 2015, 132-4, 133. 
28 See for example, the Open Letter written by Sir David Henshaw, Chairman and Chief Executive of Alder Hey 
Children’s NHS Foundation Trust detailing the ‘unprecedented personal abuse’ sustained by staff < 
https://alderhey.nhs.uk/contact-us/press-office/latest-news/open-letter-chairman-and-chief-executive-alder-hey-
childrens-nhs-foundation-trust> 
29 J Bridgeman, ‘Gard v Yates v. GOSH, the Guardian and the United Kingdom: Reflections on the Legal Process 
and the Legal Principles’ (2017) 17 Medical Law International 285, 292. 
30 D. Wilkinson and J. Savulescu, Ethics, conflict and medical treatment for children: from disagreement to 
dissensus (Elsevier, 2018), chapter 4.  
31 Neonatal Care Statistics: available at https://www.bliss.org.uk/research-campaigns/research/neonatal-care-
statistics/statistics-about-neonatal-care accessed 1st March 2020. 
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section, we draw on the reports in our collection and other sources to try to shed some light on 
why many jurisdictions have such a different experience of these situations from England and 
Wales. 
IV. DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON WHO SHOULD DECIDE FOR A 
CHILD AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR LEVELS OF LITIGATION  
There are many ways in which countries differ in how they deal with disagreements over the 
medical care of ill children. We identify four key areas of difference that may help to explain 
the lower levels of litigation in other jurisdictions. Although some of these are inherently 
intertwined, we attempt to tease them apart here to elucidate as far as possible their distinct 
implications.  
The first of these is different approaches to the legal threshold at which the court’s authority to 
determine what should be done arises. Very strongly related to this is the second difference, 
namely that in many jurisdictions, one group is afforded a much stronger say about a child’s 
care. In a sense, there is a ‘dominant’ voice to which other views tend to yield (be it the doctors 
or the parents), either in law or merely as a matter of practice. Underpinning these different 
approaches, but also shaping how disputes are managed more generally, are the social and 
cultural differences between jurisdictions. These naturally affect both legal frameworks and 
the practice of dispute resolution, and so play a part in whether a ‘dominant’ voice emerges, 
and when it is considered appropriate for the state to intervene. However, there are also wider 
implications of these differences, most clearly a tendency in some countries towards communal 
decision-making and consensus building. Finally, these differences crystallise into some 
countries adopting non-legal or quasi-legal mechanisms for resolving disputes. We focus on 
two: mediation and the use of ethics committees.   
A. The Threshold Question: When Do Courts Have the Authority to 
Determine What May be Done? 
In England and Wales, the threshold for the court having authority to make determinations 
about a child’s medical care is low: the court may make a decision wherever the child’s 
‘welfare’ is at issue or their ‘best interests’ are not being met (used interchangeably in the case 
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law).32 A number of other jurisdictions mirror this position: Belgium, Spain, and Hong Kong 
amongst others also use ‘best interests’ as a threshold; and given the likelihood that the Scottish 
courts may follow the English example, a similar threshold probably operates under Scots 
law.33 This position has come under fire in recent years in England, after counsel for the parents 
in Gard explicitly challenged the state’s authority (exercised via the court) to intervene in what 
were argued to be private, family decisions. Although the Court of Appeal was not swayed by 
arguments to adopt a harm-based threshold for judicial intervention,34 the case prompted a 
highly-charged debate about who should have the final say about a child’s treatment.35  
However, despite the controversy in this country, our collection demonstrates that numerous 
other jurisdictions already appear to adopt some form of ‘harm threshold’. In Chile, for 
example, the threshold is one of risk of serious harm or death,36 while the Mexican Supreme 
Court has held that parental authority is only limited when the rights of the child are put at risk, 
or their health threatened. In Ireland, the court will make a determination only in exceptional 
cases where the parents’ failure in their responsibilities is likely to prejudicially affect the safety 
 
32 See Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust v Wyatt [2005] EWCA Civ 1181. This was confirmed by the Court of 
Appeal (and, in refusing permission to appeal, the Supreme Court) in Yates & Anor. v Great Ormond Street 
Hospital for Children NHS Foundation Trust & Anor [2017] EWCA Civ 410.  
33 Alan Brown examines the question of whether the Scots courts will follow the English in A Brown, ‘‘Parental 
Rights’, ‘Best Interests’ and the Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment of Children in Scotland: A 
Lack of Authority’ in I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young 
Children: A Comparative Perspective (forthcoming, Hart Publishing); I Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, 
‘Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Children in English and Welsh Law: A Child-Centred Best Interests 
Approach’ in I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young Children: A 
Comparative Perspective (forthcoming, Hart Publishing). This is particularly likely as the English dicta align 
fairly easily with ‘welfare test’, set out in section 11 (7) (a) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, which covers 
disputes regarding all aspects of ‘parental responsibilities’ and ‘parental rights’. s.11 of the Children (Scotland) 
Act 1995 sets out the court’s powers in relation to parental responsibilities and rights; in particular s.11 (2) 
provides that, ‘[t]he court may make such order…as it thinks fit’. 
34 See, however, the ongoing campaign to introduce changes via what is known as ‘Charlie’s Law’: 
https://www.thecharliegardfoundation.org/charlies-law/. We will discuss this later in this piece.  
35 See for example, C. Auckland and I. Goold, ‘Parental rights, best interests and significant harms: who should 
have the final say over a child's medical care?’ (2019) The Cambridge Law Journal 1-37; D. Archard, ‘My child, 
my choice’: parents, doctors and the ethical standards for resolving their disagreement.’ (2019) Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly 70(1): 93-109; S. Shar, A. Rosenberg and D. Diekema, ‘Charlie Gard and the Limits of Best 
Interests’ (2017) JAMA 171(10): 937-938; K Gollop and S Pope, ‘Charlie Gard, Alfie Evans and R (A Child): 
Why A Medical Treatment Significant Harm Test Would Hinder Not Help’ (The Transparency Project, 2018) 
www.transparencyproject.org.uk/charlie-gard-alfie-evans-and-r-a-child-why-a-medical-treatment-significant-
harm-test-would-hinder-not-help/.  
36 F Lathrop Gómez , ‘Decisions About Their Body: Children's Rights and Parental Responsibility in Chile’ in I. 
Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young Children: A Comparative 
Perspective (forthcoming, Hart Publishing). 
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or welfare of any of their children37 — a parental refusal for their child to receive a heel prick 
test to screen for disorders at birth was not, for example, sufficient.38 Swiss law meanwhile, 
requires that the parents’ wishes pose serious endangerment to the child’s health, although if 
the doctors treating the child consider that this poses a significant risk to the child’s welfare, 
they can involve the child protection authority.39 Calvin Ho and Sharon Kau, too, note that the 
threshold in Singapore is effectively a significant harm threshold and the courts have 
consistently reflected the view in their judgments that judicial intervention “should be an 
avenue of last resort”.40  
Even in countries where the legal threshold is best interests, it may be that in practice the courts 
apply something closer to a harm threshold. This could explain the outcomes in English cases: 
while in both Gard and Evans, the court supported applications by hospitals to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment against the wishes of the parents, as the recent Raqeeb decision suggests, 
where the child is unlikely to suffer harm, life-sustaining treatment may be permitted to 
continue, even though doctors do not consider it in the child’s best interests.41 Similarly in 
Director Clinical Services, Child & Adolescent Services v Kiszko42 in Australia, Thackray CJ 
was clear that the court ‘should not interfere in the exercise of parental responsibility unless 
there is some clear justification for doing so’,43 a statement which Cameron Stewart regards as 
“very close in flavour to the principle of ‘risk of significant harm’”, suggesting as it does 
“primacy for parental decision-making and a preference for the court not exercising power in 
cases when the parental decision is clearly not incorrect or badly made.”44 Leslie Francis et al 
 
37 L. Bracken and J. Lombard, ‘Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Children in Ireland’ in I. Goold, C. 
Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young Children: A Comparative Perspective 
(forthcoming, Hart Publishing). 
38 L. Bracken and J. Lombard, ‘Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Children in Ireland’ in I. Goold, C. 
Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young Children: A Comparative Perspective 
(forthcoming, Hart Publishing). 
39 A. Buechler, ‘ Parental Decisions on their Children’s Medical Treatment’ in I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. 
Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young Children: A Comparative Perspective (forthcoming, Hart 
Publishing). 
40 C. Ho and S. Kaur. ‘Parental Rights, Best Interests and Significant Harms: Singapore and Malaysia Perspectives 
on Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Children’ in I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-
Making on Behalf of Young Children: A Comparative Perspective (forthcoming, Hart Publishing). 
41 Raqeeb v Barts NHS Foundation Trust & Anors [2019] EWHC 2531 (Admin). 
42 [2016] FCWA 34.  
43 Ibid, [67]-[68]. This was later reiterated by O’Brien J in. Director Clinical Services, Child & Adolescent 
Services v Kiszko [2016] FCWA 75 (Kiszko 3) at [72]. 
44 C. Stewart, ‘Children and Medical Decision-Making in Australia Post-Gard: A Possible Reformulation’ in I. 
Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young Children: A Comparative 
Perspective (forthcoming, Hart Publishing). 
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meanwhile, argue that the approach in the United States, in some states at least, is similar.45 
They suggest that ‘the state generally respects parental decisions except when they place a 
child’s health, well-being, or life in jeopardy’,46 although Paris et al have noted that this may 
be shifting more towards a best interests approach.47 What emerges from this is that the legal 
threshold for intervention is only a very small part of the story, with the mechanisms available 
for bringing disputes before the courts, and differing cultural attitudes on who ought to have 
decisive say being far more important in practice to the outcome of cases. This is perhaps 
clearest in China, where although Article 35 of the General Provisions of Civil Law 2017 
(‘GPCL’) requires guardians to exercise their responsibilities in accordance with the child’s 
best interest, in practice: 
the best interests of the child principle laid down in article 35(1) of the GPCL has hardly 
restricted how guardians make proxy medical decisions for children. Hospitals and medical 
practitioners always follow the guardian’s proxy medical decision even though it appears 
prejudicial to the child where the guardian refuses a treatment proposed by the treating doctor.48 
This is unsurprising given the high level of deference to familial decisions (explored below), 
and the lack of procedural rules for dealing with conflicts where the child’s best interests are 
clearly not being met. Nonetheless it suggests that when attempting to learn from the approach 
of other jurisdictions, one must look beyond merely the legal structures in place. 
B. Culture, Society, Family: Who Decides for a Child? 
Alongside these legal thresholds, we can also discern practices, as opposed to legal 
frameworks, that afford one voice de facto authority over others where there would otherwise 
be dispute. In order to understand these, we will consider them in conjunction with the wider 
social and cultural forces that shape how a jurisdiction approaches these situations.  
 
45 L. Francis, J. Botkin and D. Diekema, ‘Decision-Making on Behalf of Children in the Research and Clinical 
Context: A US Perspective’ in I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of 
Young Children: A Comparative Perspective (forthcoming, Hart Publishing). 
46 L. Francis, J. Botkin and D. Diekema, ‘Decision-Making on Behalf of Children in the Research and Clinical 
Context: A US Perspective’ in I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of 
Young Children: A Comparative Perspective (forthcoming, Hart Publishing).  
47 J J Paris, J Ahluwalia, B M Cummings, M P Moreland, and D J Wilkinson, ‘The Charlie Gard case: British and 
American approaches to court resolution of disputes over medical decisions’ J Perinatol. 2017 Dec; 37(12): 1268–
1271 
48 D Chunyan, ‘ Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Children in China: A Multidimensional Analysis of 
Parental Authoritarianism’ in I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young 
Children: A Comparative Perspective (forthcoming, Hart Publishing). 
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In English law, parents’ authority to consent to or refuse treatment on behalf of their child must 
be exercised in a manner that promotes the child’s welfare.49 As Lady Hale explained, “parents 
are not entitled to insist upon treatment by anyone which is not in their child’s best interests”.50 
While the medical team are therefore entitled to apply to the court in the event that they disagree 
with the parents over the best course of action for the child, in practice, Dominic Wilkinson 
explains that medical teams generally defer to parental wishes unless the child is likely to be 
harmed: 
Paediatricians and general practitioners spend a good deal of time counselling parents and 
encouraging them to make healthcare decisions for their children that are likely to promote the 
child’s interests. However, if parents make suboptimal decisions, professionals will usually 
only seek to override parents if what parents have decided poses a real risk of harming the 
child.51 
While no jurisdiction conceived parental ‘rights’ as absolute, other countries took very different 
approaches to the question of when parents’ authority to decide for their child ought to yield, 
notwithstanding the fact that all jurisdictions considered (barring the United States) had ratified 
the UNCRC52 and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 
Human Being with regard to the application of Biology and Medicine. These legal differences 
in parental authority appeared to be underpinned by social and cultural differences, in particular 
over the centrality of the family unit in society. While we are conscious about not wishing to 
make sweeping or unsubstantiated generalisations about other cultures, it was notable that some 
jurisdictions reported that parental and familial views held much greater authority than they do 
in England and Wales. For example, Daisy Cheung explained that Confucianism continues to 
guide behaviour in Chinese societies, such as China, Hong Kong and Taiwan,53 according to 
 
49 Wyatt v. Portsmouth NHS Trust [2005] EWHC 117 (Fam); Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates and Gard 
[2017] EWHC 972 (Fam) (Gard); Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children NHS Foundation Trust v Yates 
[2017] EWCA Civ 410 (Gard 2); Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust v Mr Thomas Evans, Ms Kate 
James, Alfie Evans (A Child by his Guardian CAFCASS Legal) [2018] EWHC 308 (Fam) (Evans), [2018] 2 FLR 
1223; Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Ms Thomas, Haastrup and Haastrup [2018] EWHC 127 
(Fam), [2018] 2 FLR 1028 (Haastrup). Raqeeb v Barts NHS Foundation Trust & Anors [2019] EWHC 2531 
(Admin). 
50 “Lady Hale’s Explanation of the Supreme Court’s Decision”, as delivered in court on 8 June 2017, available at 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/permission-to-appeal-hearing-in-the-matter-of-charlie- gard.html> 
(accessed on 20 March 2019).  
51 D.Wilkinson, ‘In defence of a conditional harm threshold for paediatric decision-making’ in I.Goold, J. Herring 
and C. Auckland (eds) Parental Rights, Best Interests and Significant Harms, 92-93. 
52 UN-CRC of 20 November 1989. 
53 D. Cheung, ‘ Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Minors: The Hong Kong Context’ in I. Goold, C. Auckland 
and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young Children: A Comparative Perspective 
(forthcoming, Hart Publishing). 
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which the key unit for decision-making is the family, and not the individual. Edwin Hui has 
similarly argued that:  
Most modern people in the West adopt an ‘individualist worldview’, i.e. they regard personal 
values held by individuals as more valid than the collective values held by a given social entity 
such as the family. In contrast, East Asian people have a ‘familist worldview’: individuals take 
their values from the collective values of the family. Traditionally, a Chinese person’s existence 
is entirely ‘family-centred’. He depends on his family for his identity and for all his financial, 
physical, emotional and spiritual needs. Without a family he has nowhere to go and no one to 
trust. For China and many of her neighbouring countries, familism has been traditionally 
attributed to Confucianism.54  
The centrality afforded to the family in Chinese societies means that, as Cheung explains, 
‘medical decisions are to be made by the family as a whole, with the emphasis being on 
‘harmonious interdependence’’.55 Hui further explains that it is the family who have ‘authority 
as interpreters of the patient’s best interests’;56 in particular, the father is ‘responsible for 
maintaining family integrity and harmony’57 and so his authority ‘is supreme and final’.58  The 
result is that ‘physicians in Chinese societies may be less willing to contradict family decisions 
because this can be seen as disruptive of family harmony and integrity’,59 which may help to 
explain why there are ‘very few examples of such decisions’ in the case law.60 Ding Chunyan, 
writing in China, similarly observed that medics largely defer to parental decisions, although 
she attributed this in part to “strained relationships” between families and doctors. This 
deference, she suggests, enables parents to make decisions in the interests of the family as a 
whole (rather than just the child), taking into account “financial burdens of the family, the 
interests of other children in the family, the impact on the career of adult family members, the 
 
54 E. Hui, ‘Parental Refusal of Life-Saving treatments for adolescents: chinese familism in medical decision-
making re-visited’ (2008) Bioethics Vol 22(5): 286–295, 286-7. 
55 D. Cheung, ‘ Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Minors: The Hong Kong Context’ in I. Goold, C. Auckland 
and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young Children: A Comparative Perspective 
(forthcoming, Hart Publishing).  
56 E. Hui, ‘Parental Refusal of Life-Saving treatments for adolescents: chinese familism in medical decision-
making re-visited’ (2008) Bioethics Vol 22(5): 286–295; citing R. Fan & B. Li. ‘Truth Telling in Medicine: The 
Confucian View’ (2004) J Med Philos 29: 179–193. 
57 E. Hui, ‘Parental Refusal of Life-Saving treatments for adolescents: chinese familism in medical decision-
making re-visited’ (2008) Bioethics Vol 22(5): 286–295, 286-7. 
58 Ibid.  
59 D. Cheung, ‘ Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Minors: The Hong Kong Context’ in I. Goold, C. Auckland 
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(forthcoming, Hart Publishing).  
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implications for family life etc.”61 The result is that she reports that the courts in China “have 
never intervened in a guardian’s medical decision for a child”,62 even in cases of parental 
refusal of treatment for conditions that are curable.  
Other countries also reported parents having extensive authority when it comes to making 
medical decisions for their child. According to Thitinant Tengaumnuay for example, in 
Thailand this offers an explanation for the lack of judicial intervention in the parents’ decision-
making, and the lack of “legal provisions setting particular checks or reviews on parental 
decisions concerning their children’s medical treatment”.63 She argues that Thai doctors often 
remain passive in the face of parental decisions with which they do not agree, asserting that 
doctors “would not provide health treatment that opposes the parents’ decision”. In Peru 
meanwhile, Paula Siverino Bavio likewise states that doctors tend to avoid conflict and defer 
to parental desires to continue treatment for fear of being regarded as having illegally failed to 
treat.64 She noted that 
If the Gard case had happened in Peru, and the parents had been able to afford the treatment, 
their will would have been fulfilled. It is unlikely that the medical team would oppose, let alone 
legally fight to achieve the withdrawal of life support.65  
In these countries, the low levels of litigation seem to be explained in part by medical teams 
deferring to the parents wishes, even where they might disagree, rather than taking matters to 
court. This was also borne out in a study in Norway, where there are similarly few cases.66 
Researchers presented doctors with a hypothetical case concerning a critically ill child, whose 
parents are insisting on life-prolonging treatment that, on medical opinion, is futile. The study 
found that doctors would defer to parents ‘to a greater extent than justified by the law, 
 
61 D Chunyan, ‘ Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Children in China: A Multidimensional Analysis of 
Parental Authoritarianism’ in I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Young 
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64 P Siverino Bavio, ‘Who Decides the Best Interests of the Child in the End-of-Life Process? A Look at the 
Peruvian and Argentine Reality’ in I. Goold, C. Auckland and J. Herring, Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of 
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65 Ibid.  
66 K. Sovig, ‘Reviewing Medical Decisions Concerning Infants Within the Norwegian Health Care System – A 
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sometimes in contravention of the child’s best interests’67 and a majority would give intensive 
treatment to a child, despite it not being medically indicated and notwithstanding the 
Norwegian Patients Rights Act being clear that doctors are permitted to make their own 
evaluation of best interests and need not follow parental requests.68  Most would have attempted 
to influence parents to change their minds first, but 5% would said they would not have even 
tried to dissuade parents. In their explanations for this, doctors tended to focus on the parents’ 
authority and responsibility for the child. One said ‘treating a child in conflict with the wishes 
of the parents is almost equivalent to treating a patient against his or her own will’, while 
another suggested that ‘if the parents insist, it seems unreasonable to refuse.’69  
In some jurisdictions, however, deference appeared to be paid to the medical professionals 
rather than to families, again potentially resulting in much lower levels of dispute and recourse 
to the courts. In relation to Malaysia for example, Ho and Kau observed that:  
The fact that the courts have never been asked to intervene in a situation where parents and 
healthcare providers disagree about a child’s treatment options is instructive. Malaysian parents 
may be reluctant to challenge decisions made by healthcare providers. There is some evidence 
that parents in most instances defer to recommendations of doctors.70  
In Sweden, Leviner explains that there is a “high degree of trust” of individuals for one another 
and for public institutions, particularly the medical profession, who have traditionally enjoyed 
substantial respect as a profession.71 In her view, this may have led to a greater degree of 
deference to the view of the medical professionals, with families more likely to acquiesce rather 
than continue to voice their disagreement and resist. Similar observations were made by 
Monica Navarro-Michel writing about the experiences of Spain, who suggested that the fact 
that parents had never challenged doctors in the courts could be explained by the fact that 
 
67 M. K. Bahus and R. Føerde, ‘Parents As Decision-Makers — Do the Attitudes of Norwegian Doctors Conform 
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physicians are highly respected in Spain, ranking top of the most trusted professionals.72 We 
would tentatively suggest that in these jurisdictions, one ‘voice’ tends to be dominant, and 
others yield to it, and that therefore disputes are less likely to arise. By contrast, in the much 
more litigious United States, a study of American paediatricians found that a majority would 
override parents with whom they disagreed (on a treatment refusal) if they felt treatment was 
in the child’s best interests.73  
Other jurisdictions meanwhile, reported taking a much more communitarian approach to 
decision-making, rather than allowing one voice to dominate, and this too appeared to be 
associated with lower levels of litigation. For example, both contributors from African 
countries74 noted a communitarian approach to decision-making in the jurisdictions considered 
which, coupled with a commitment to resolving disputes by avoiding conflict, meant disputes 
rarely found their way into the courts. This was bolstered by the central position occupied by 
the family in some African countries. As Moyo comments, for example, both South Africa and 
Botswana  
are largely inhabited by ethnic groups that are predominantly communitarian and therefore view 
children as an integral or inseparable part of the family. Communitarian cultures and societies 
pose a serious challenge to the individualistic nature of rights, particularly those of children. 
Children’s rights potentially clash with African cultural ideology because the latter emphasises 
collectivism, reciprocal duties of support and restraint on individual rights. Hence, the 
preservation of group identity is thought to be in the interests of the child and the interests of 
the family. There is an attempt to limit conflict at all costs, even though this may mean a 
violation of children’s rights to medical treatment and access to health care services.75 
Samuel Ujewe suggests that this communitarianism is a feature of the “African ethics outlook” 
wherein  
communal responsibility takes centre stage and the moral frame of reference is underpinned by 
the network of communal relationships.  The ethic of communal responsibility emphasises a 
preoccupation with the wellbeing of whole communities or societies; not simply of individuals 
constituting them. It motivates individual members to seek the good of the community or 
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society as a whole, in virtue of which they also seek their own good and build a firm basis for 
a sustained wellbeing. 
Consequently, he explains, “[r]estoring the health of the family member, especially if they are 
a child: “…cannot be a matter for doctor and patient alone: it demands the participation of the 
entire community”.76 Highly communitarian cultures may therefore also correlate more 
strongly with lower levels of litigation.  
All of these approaches are fairly distinct from the English experience, where no voice (other 
than eventually that of the court) tends to dominate. This is illustrated by the very fact that so 
many cases end up in the courts, with neither party having been prepared to yield, but it was 
also evidenced in the deeply divided public discourse that followed the recent cases of Gard 
and Evans, which showed that far from there being a clear and dominant perspective in this 
country, significant differences of opinion exist about who is best placed to decide what is best 
for a child (and accordingly whether the parents should or should not have been allowed to take 
the child abroad for treatment in these cases). Not only is there no homogenous perspective in 
this country on whether it is doctors or parents who ought to have the decisive say in disputes 
of this kind, but England and Wales also clearly do not share the collectivist outlook seen across 
some African jurisdictions and there is rarely a wider communal response to such questions. 
Given this, we may ask what, if anything, we can learn from the way that other countries 
approach these disputes, informed as they are by social and cultural values which are not 
necessarily shared in England and Wales.  
C. Can We Learn from these Perspectives? 
In order to critically evaluate whether can achieve a reduction in litigation by making some 
changes inspired by this comparison (and whether this would be desirable), it is first necessary 
to consider why such disputes are arising, and what the nature of the disagreement is in these 
cases. Only then can we appraise how we might otherwise avoid or resolve such disputes.  
Deciding whether to offer further treatment to a seriously ill child engages not just medical 
considerations, but a range of emotional, psychological, relational and spiritual interests of the 
child. When determining the child’s best interests, the decision-maker must then balance these 
 
76 Ibid, quoting from B. Bujo, Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality 
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different interests and factors against one another, to form a view about what, overall, is best 
for them. This necessarily involves a process of weighting, attaching greater importance to 
some interests or factors, and lesser importance to others. How one goes about this will 
inevitably be influenced to some extent by the decision-makers own values and beliefs, for 
example over the inherent value of life, what makes for a ‘good’ death, or what chances are 
worth taking and at what costs. As Alexander Kon observes, ‘deciding when the outcome of 
care will be a fate worse than death’ is a deeply personal matter: ‘there is no right or wrong 
answer.’77 Perspectives may also change over time. In Re B in 1981 for example,78 the English 
courts caused controversy when they authorised life-saving treatment for a child with downs 
syndrome against the wishes of her parents, yet it seems inconceivable now that a court would 
even contemplate refusing to authorise a straightforward operation to remove an intestinal 
blockage, where the child would otherwise die. 
Different people, with different belief structures or values, or who ascribe different weights to 
medical considerations vis-à-vis other factors, might then reasonably weigh the interests 
differently, reaching a different assessment of the child’s best interests. As Ros McDougall 
explains: 
a child’s well-being is made up of different elements, such as being free from pain, having a 
long lifespan, having meaningful relationships and being able to play. There is no 
straightforward way of calculating well-being and comparing it across treatment options to 
identify which would be best. And there are often several possible courses of action, each of 
which would benefit the child in different ways. 79    
Disputes will therefore inevitably arise whenever doctors balance the child’s interests 
differently to parents. This may be as a result of differences in perspective, beliefs and values, 
which as Janine Winters explains, derive not merely from the person’s origin, but rather a 
person may be a part of different ‘cultures’: ‘their professional subculture, their culture of 
origin, and the prevailing societal culture’,80 all of which will influence their values to some 
extent.  Certainly there is some evidence that doctors may assess quality of life differently to 
parents. An empirical study by Paul Muirhead for example, found that while healthcare 
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professionals and parents ‘viewed the mild to moderately disabled states similarly’, ‘parents 
were more accepting of the severely disabled health state than health care professionals’.81 
Douglas Diekema’s example of chemotherapy illustrates the scope for disagreement: 
Although medical considerations are important, a child’s interests will also be affected by 
emotional and physical accompaniments of the chosen course. Best interests all too frequently 
may be reduced to objective medical interests alone. In discussing chemotherapy for a child 
with leukaemia, for example, medical professionals frequently focus on the fact that therapy 
will increase the child’s chance of survival while underestimating the negative aspects of cancer 
treatment. Some parents may place greater weight on the risks, side effects, discomforts, and 
disruptions that the child may endure in being treated, perhaps making the judgment that the 
increased chance of survival does not justify those burdens. Determining how these multiple 
factors ought to be weighed is no simple matter.82 
Best interests assessments then, especially when they relate to how and when it is best for a 
child’s life to end, are not solely medical decisions, nor are they susceptible to proof. Rather 
they are value-decisions, about what is important in life and what makes a life go well, over 
which people may — and do — legitimately disagree.  
This was exemplified in the recent case of Raqeeb,83 which concerned a young girl with severe 
and irreversible brain damage, who was in a minimally conscious state with little or no 
awareness. Her medical team concluded that she had no prospect of recovery, and that further 
treatment was therefore futile and not in her best interests. This was strongly opposed by her 
parents who wished, in accordance with their Muslim beliefs, to do everything possible to 
sustain her life. Unlike in Gard and Evans, MacDonald J concluded that further treatment 
would be in her best interests. In doing so however, he noted that the answer to what was in 
her best interests rested on “subjective” and “highly value laden ethical, moral or religious 
factors” which “mean different things to different people in a diverse, multicultural, multifaith 
society”.84 In particular, he recognised that the inherent value or ‘benefit’ of continued 
existence was a question of value. Given ‘the religious and cultural tradition in which Tafida 
was being raised’, she would derive some benefit from continued life precisely because it would 
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enable her to live according to the tenets of the religion in which she was raised and ‘for which 
she had begun to demonstrate a basic affinity.’85 
In disputes of this kind, where the treating team and parents fundamentally disagreed over 
whether there was any inherent value to being kept alive in a heavily disabled and brain 
damaged state, it is difficult to see how consensus could ever have been reached. As Kon rightly 
observes, when parents objections derive from ‘religious, cultural, or personal beliefs, there 
may be no common ground on which the team and the parents can agree.’86 This is further 
exemplified in the cases of Alfie Evans (whose parents were Roman Catholics) and Isaiah 
Haastrup (whose parents were Pentecostal Christians), both of which concerned whether 
further treatment ought to be given to severely brain damaged children. In the latter case 
Macdonald J noted the ‘strong religious component to the mother’s view of what should happen 
in this case’, according to which ‘it is not her right, or indeed anybody’s right, to say who 
should live and who should die.’87 This is not to suggest that disputes are all over questions of 
values, and not matters of fact. In the case of Isaiah Haastrup for example,88 the dispute was 
compounded by the parents’ refusal to accept medical facts about his prognosis put forward by 
both his treating team, and the independent experts appointed by them.89 However it does 
demonstrate that differences of values have been a crucial component of many of the disputes 
that have come before the courts in recent years, as acknowledged by the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, who regarded value-differences as a key reason for disputes arising in this context.90  
Given this, there may be reason to think that it would be hard to extrapolate the cultural 
tendency towards consensus-building and avoidance of conflict seen in some countries, to a 
country such as England, which is less homogenous in values. Certainly a number of 
contributors to the collection suggested that consensus was feasible in their jurisdictions 
because of the substantial levels of shared values and cultural homogeneity. Moyo observes of 
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2828 (Fam); Re A (A Child) [2015] EWHC 443 (Fam). 
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Botswana for example, that the presence of only one major ethnic group (the Tswana), 
combines with “the socialisation of citizens along communitarian lines” to leave only “limited 
room for the clash of diverse values”. Hence he suggests, “it could be that the prevailing 
uniform value system limits the possibility of conflicts between parents themselves”.91 The 
opposite may be true of England, and we might speculate that in a multi-cultural and multi-
faith country such as this, with greater value-pluralism and fewer shared cultural perspectives, 
disagreements over values may be both more likely to arise, and, when they do arise, harder 
(albeit not impossible) to resolve without court intervention.  
Within this context, there is also a concern that attempts to achieve consensus might in fact 
result in undue deference to one party, with the voice of the other being effectively silenced. 
Leviner suggests that this might be an explanation for the lack of case law in Sweden, positing 
that what looks like consensus building might be better characterised as ‘conflict-burying’ 
rather than conflict-solving.92 There is a risk, in her view, that the consensus paradigm in fact 
conceals coercion that ‘should be dealt with legally.’93 Drawing on empirical research from the 
domestic context, Austin and Huxtable have raised similar concerns that where ‘shared 
decision-making’ is attempted between doctors and parents, 
some researchers have suggested that, in practice, these discussions might amount to no more 
than a consultation of the parents ’ views, with the true aim being to secure their acquiescence 
to the care plan proposed by the clinical team. Efforts at persuasion appeared to feature in the 
cases just outlined. There is a risk, however, that such efforts will cause parents to feel they 
have no real choice in decision-making, thus cultivating a fear of bad faith.94 
A culture of deference to doctors which results in parents feeling unable to voice discontent at 
the way their child is being treated would clearly be undesirable, especially when it comes to 
something as fundamental as the manner of their child’s death. The parents’ perspective on 
what is best for their child is clearly crucial to making good decisions for them, given their 
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special knowledge of the child’s preferences,95 and unique interest in their well-being. As 
Angela Alessandri explains, 
in most cases, parents are the people most able to identify their child’s best interests. They are 
embedded in the same cultural, racial, religious and financial context and have personal 
experience of their child’s developmental progress, personality and capacity.96  
It is also they who will ultimately bear the consequences of that decision, and who will take on 
the primary care burden for that child. More fundamentally, however, where disagreements 
concern questions of value, it is not the case that doctors necessarily know the answers to them 
any better, nor that they are the most legitimate final arbiter on them. In this case then, parents 
ought to be able to make these value-judgments for themselves, and not merely acquiesce to 
the doctors, providing that in doing so they do not expose their child to harm.  
But while it is important that parents feel able to participate fully in decisions about their child’s 
care, and have their voice listened to by the doctors, the opposite scenario — undue deference 
on the part of doctors to parental decisions — may be equally, if not more harmful. In the 
examples given above of China, Hong Kong, Thailand and Peru, a desire to avoid conflict when 
disagreements arose was thought by contributors to result in doctors failing to challenge 
parental decisions or escalate disputes, even where they believed them to be contrary to the 
child’s best interests, or worse, harmful to them. Hui describes two cases from Hong Kong in 
which fathers rejected limb amputations for their children. One persisted, and the child died, 
yet neither made it to court.97 Discussing the position in China meanwhile, Chunyan gives two 
further examples. In one widely-publicised case, a father refused treatment for his baby’s 
imperforate anus, yet judicial intervention was not sought notwithstanding others offering to 
pay for and arrange the surgery, and instead the decision was made to give the child palliative 
care.98  In another, the father of a new-born baby girl suffering from congenital oesophageal 
atresia refused to consent to an operation proposed by the doctor and the baby eventually died 
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without medical care.99 Chunyan also speculated that although no such cases have been 
reported in China thus far, if the parents were to request a life-prolonging treatment for their 
child (as in Gard or Evans), doctors would likely provide it as long as they are able to afford 
it. Similar observations were made by Siverino Bavio when reporting on the approach in Peru. 
These are, of course, only a handful of examples which may sit within complex factual 
matrices, and it is important to not make too sweeping generalisations on the basis of them. 
Nonetheless they raise a concern that undue deference on the part of doctors, operating without 
court oversight, may result in decisions which expose children to harm, even death, being 
accepted without challenge.  
Refusal of treatment is not unusual in some countries, and indeed partly explains lower survival 
rates in low and middle income countries compared to developed countries. There are a range 
of reasons for this. In the case of the child with an imperforate anus for example, the father 
reportedly felt that the treatment was causing the child pain and did not wish her to suffer.100 
One study of treatment refusal for acute lyphoblastic leukemia (ALL) in China meanwhile, 
found cost to be an important factor, as well as a belief in the incurability of ALL, despite the 
five-year survival rate following appropriate treatment being 80%.101 Indonesian and Indian 
studies on treatment refusals by parents similarly found monetary concerns to be a cause, as 
well as concerns about side effects, a belief that the condition was incurable (when it was  not), 
transport difficulties, and distrust of healthcare professionals.102 Some parents also seek 
alternative treatments to avoid the side effects of standard treatments.103 While some of these 
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reasons are understandable, acquiescence by doctors may nonetheless result in unnecessary 
loss of life in some cases.104  
Avoidance of conflict may therefore sometimes be coming at the expense of protecting the 
most vulnerable members of society. While consensus-building may be a good goal to pursue, 
this should not result in voices being hushed for the sake of avoiding a fight. For all that the 
protracted court cases in England were intensely distressing for those involved, they did ensure 
that neither doctor nor parent’s voice was presumptively silenced and that both perspectives 
were rigorously debated and scrutinised, before the court, acting as arbiter, made a final 
determination on best interests. Some degree of independent oversight and scrutiny is therefore 
essential to ensure that the child’s interests are protected and all those with a legitimate interest 
in their fate have a space to be heard.  
V. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS 
Although there are reasons to think that England is in some senses culturally and socially likely 
to be home to disputes, and may not be able to emulate other countries entirely, it does not 
follow that we cannot learn anything from other jurisdictions, and in particular, from the 
mechanisms they employ to resolve disagreement without requiring court intervention. In this 
section we explore two alternative forms of dispute resolution observed in other jurisdictions 
and consider their efficacy in the English context: mediation and hospital ethics committees.  
Before we do so, we should make clear that we are not intending to suggest that hospitals do 
not currently attempt to achieve consensus, or that they generally fail in doing so. In the 
Paediatric and Neonatal Intensive Care Unit at Great Ormond Street Hospital for example, Joe 
Brierley et al found that between 2010 and 2013, only 17 of 203 cases involving the withdrawal 
or limitation of invasive therapy could not be resolved through extensive discussion,105 
suggesting that hospitals are often successful in reaching an outcome that is amenable to 
parents. This has been bolstered  by a number of recent attempts by professional bodies to avoid 
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conflict, drawing on practice in other countries for inspiration. The new Royal College of Child 
and Paediatric Health guidance106 offers a series of practical steps, as does the 2019 Briefing 
Paper produced by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics,107 which recommends that NHS trusts 
should be supported to develop processes for ‘recognising and managing disagreements…such 
as introducing conflict management frameworks’, which have proved successful in 
Australia.108 As the Nuffield Council rightly points out, ‘there is scope for policy makers and 
others to do more to support the creation of healthcare environments that foster good, 
collaborative relationships between parents and healthcare staff’, through better 
communication with, and involvement of, parents in decisions about their children.109 This 
would of course welcome, and we share the hope that they will reduce recourse to other 
mechanisms. However our focus here is the steps that can be taken to resolve conflicts when 
consensus-building has failed at this stage.  
A. Mediation 
One suggestion that has recently gained traction is mediation. This is defined as ‘a flexible, 
confidential process which involves a neutral third party helping the parties in dispute towards 
a negotiated resolution, where the parties have the final say as to whether agreement is reached 
and, if so, on what terms’.110 It is hoped, as Austin and Huxtable explain, that it might help the 
parties to work through any stalemate, so as to reach agreement without having to rely on court 
intervention.111 Certainly Mr Justice Francis appeared to recognise its potential to do so in 
Gard, when he suggested that 
it would, in all cases like this, be helpful for there to be some form of Issues Resolution Hearing 
or other form of mediation where the parties can have confidential conversations to see what 
common ground can be reached between them.112    
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As Dominic Wilkinson et al argue, conflict can sometimes cause the focus to shift away from 
the welfare of the child, and mediation can help parents and professionals to acknowledge that, 
and facilitate a ‘less confrontational conversation’ between parties;113 as well as correcting any 
misunderstandings and ensuring that all relevant information is before each party. It also has 
the advantage of being flexible, as it can be invoked at any time, and involve anyone in the 
process, including, for example, religious leaders.114 Certainly other jurisdictions have found 
mediation to be helpful, with Ko and Haur commenting that in Singapore and to a more limited 
extent Malaysia, a combination of mediation and ethics committees ‘appear to have been 
effective in preventing a disagreement from escalating into a full-scale legal battle’.115 
Accordingly, the Royal College of Paediatric and Child Health now recommends the early 
involvement of mediation services as a strategy for helping to achieve consensus.116 To 
facilitate this, a Bill is currently before Parliament to mandate its wider use, which has passed 
its second reading in the House of Lords and is currently at Committee Stage. According to the 
Access to Palliative Care and Treatment of Children Bill (the campaign for which has 
colloquially been termed ‘Charlie’s Law’), an application could not be made to the High Court 
under the Children Act 1989 or inherent jurisdiction unless: 
(a) the health service body has followed a process of mediation with an independent mediator in an 
attempt to resolve any differences between the health service body and any person who has parental 
responsibility for the child or is recognised by the health service body to have an interest in the welfare 
of the child, and  
(b) that process has been unsuccessful in reaching substantial agreement about the medical treatment to 
be given or not to be given to the child. 
The only exception would be where the issue is urgent and it is in the best interests of the child 
to proceed to a court hearing, or where the parents fail to engage in the mediation process.  
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While mediation certainly has the potential to resolve disputes before court intervention, and 
ought to be available to parents who wish to access it, it is unlikely in itself to prove a panacea. 
Often the contexts in which it proves to be most effective — the dissolution of marriages or 
commercial disputes — are those in which the issue is amenable to some ‘give-and-take’ or 
compromise. Mediation is then directed at reaching an outcome that is broadly agreeable to 
both parties. It is more difficult to see how it will help in decisions which are inherently more 
binary, such as over whether to offer treatment to a child at the end of life, where there is not 
obvious ‘middle ground’ between positions. In Gard, Evans and Raqeeb for example, either 
the child was allowed to go abroad for further treatment, or treatment would be withdrawn and 
they would die. Achieving compromise in this context is hard: for the parent who regard’s their 
child’s life as inherently valuable, anything short of further treatment would be unacceptable. 
For the doctor meanwhile, agreeing to act in a way that they strongly believe to be contrary to 
the child’s interests (and potentially harmful), would require them to compromise on their core 
ethical duty to do good for their patient, or as Jo Bridgman puts it, to act contrary to their 
professional conscience.117 Anticipating this, one or other party may fail to engage fully in the 
process, which will further undermine its likelihood of success.  
Mediation in these cases may then have done little more than to delay access to court 
proceedings and entrench the parties’ positions further. Even absent mandatory mediation, Joe 
Brierley et al have raised concerns that the process of seeking second opinions and ethical 
reviews before applying to court 
can be protracted and arguably damaging to parents, to healthcare workers looking after the 
child and of course most importantly to the child itself. Such situations should result in rapid 
intervention… Instead, usually after many weeks or months of protracted unsuccessful 
discussions, with both sides trying to get the other to see their point of view, a request is made 
to the courts for a declaration on how to proceed.118  
This led them to conclude that ‘protracted dialogue was often unable to resolve these 
differences’ (meanwhile ‘the child was subject to pain and discomfort from invasive 
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ventilation, suctioning and multiple injections’) and we should instead facilitate rapid access 
to the courts.119  
In addition to concerns about delays, mediation may also prove to be very expensive for the 
NHS. It is also essential that there is clarity over what question is being mediated (is it the 
possibility of further treatment, the current treatment, or palliative care?); and over who selects 
the mediator. Given Janine Winters’ concerns that mediators may be subject to ‘inadvertent 
bias, particularly cultural bias toward medical culture and medical values’,120 parents must have 
faith in their independence if they are to be successful in building trust between parties.  
But mediation is also unlikely to prove effective in the absence of court determination of at 
least some cases. While we clearly support allowing space for different perspectives, an entirely 
unstructured or open-ended debate on what should be done can be unproductive. Judicial 
declarations on disputes therefore create a legal framework within which subsequent 
discussions can be had, which as Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser observe, can aid 
resolution in mediation.121 They make this point in the context of divorce, but the point 
arguably applies in this context as well. As they put it: 
Divorcing parents do not bargain over the division of family wealth and custodial prerogatives 
in a vacuum; they bargain in the shadow of the law. The legal rules governing alimony, child 
support, marital property, and custody give each parent certain claims based on what each 
would get if the case went to trial. In other words, the outcome that the law will impose if no 
agreement is reached gives each parent certain bargaining chips-an endowment of sorts.122 
They suggest that this helps facilitate parties reaching agreement because it reduces the range 
of possible options in mediation to only those that leave the parties better off than if they failed 
to agree and had to resort to the courts.123 In the treatment context, this might translate into 
removing some options from the table if the courts have consistently deemed them not to be in 
the best interests of a child in the past (such as heavily experimental treatment which might 
result in pain to the child). For mediation to be successful therefore, some judicial 
determination remains essential.  
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Even if agreement can be reached, there remains a more fundamental concern that finding a 
‘middle ground’ that is broadly amenable to both parties, will not necessarily result in the best 
outcome for the child. While Wilkinson et al suggest that mediation must be directed ‘towards 
an ethical outcome’, not mere agreement,124 it is difficult to see how this can be guaranteed.  
B. Hospital Ethics Committees as Decision-Makers 
Another suggestion that came out of the collection was the possibility of utilising clinical ethics 
committees (‘CECs’) in the place of the courts. Many countries have internal hospital 
mechanisms for managing disagreement, albeit these operate under different names and carry 
varying degrees of authority. While in most jurisdictions (including England) they do not carry 
legal authority, in some, for example Israel, Texas, Chile and Argentina, ethics committee can 
make best interest determinations.125 In Israel for example, the institution’s committee is able 
to make binding determinations. A distinction is drawn there between children who are dying 
(defined as terminally ill with less than six months to live) and those who are not, but suffer 
from incurable conditions. In relation to the former, section 28 of the Dying Patient Act 2005 
provides that in the event of a disagreement between the parents and treating clinicians, the 
matter will be brought before the institution’s ethics committee which has the authority to make 
decisions in these matters, including a decision to withhold treatment.126 These committees 
comprise doctors, nurses, bioethicists, lawyer, social workers, psychologist, and relevant 
clergy. According to Roy Gilbar (with whom Carmel Shalev agrees127), the goal of this system 
is to avoid conflicts being taken before the court, and to facilitate rapid decision-making that 
is “not subject to rigid legal procedures”,128 and is less adversarial in approach.129 Similarly in 
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Argentina, Fabiola Lathrop Gomez explains that under Article 17 of 'Regulations on the rights 
and responsibilities of people in the context of actions related to their health care’,130 any 
parental decision which puts a child at risk of serious harm must be referred to an ethics 
committee, who then determines the child’s best interests. This can then be appealed to the 
Court of Appeal.  
Clinical ethics committees enjoy even greater authority in Texas, United States. Under the 
Advance Directives Act (now Chapter 166 of the Texas Health and Safety Code), where 
doctors wish to refuse a request for treatment by a patient or their family, doctors may refer the 
case to a hospital ethics committee. If the committee agrees that further treatment would be 
‘medically inappropriate’, the medical team are legally permitted to withdraw or withhold 
treatment after 10 days, unless the family can find another doctor who is willing to offer the 
treatment sought.131 In 2005, for example, ventilation was withdraw from a baby dying from a 
form of dwarfism, against the wishes of his family, using this process.132 The family can appeal 
to a court to extend this period, but only if there is evidence that the patient is likely to be 
accepted at another unit if given more time. Otherwise they can only apply for judicial review 
of the committee’s decision.  
These examples prompt us to question whether clinical ethics committees ought to play a 
greater role in disputes of this kind, and in particular whether they ought to be able to make 
legally binding decisions, in the place of courts. Austin and Huxtable explain that 
CECs explicitly focus on the ethical dimensions of the case before them, which suggests they 
might be well-equipped to advise on values-based disputes. For example, as was the case in 
Haastrup, a clinician might believe that treatment should stop, but a family with particular 
religious beliefs – such as in the sanctity of life – might want treatment to continue.133 In such 
cases, a CEC could help to identify and elucidate the underlying ethical values, and point to 
areas of commonality or in which a compromise might be achieved, through which efforts 
resolution might then be reached.134 
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They also observe that clinical ethics committees often have extensive experience considering 
issues such as the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment; and that they are not intended to be 
adversarial, with the result that ‘relative to the courts, CECs are able to pool diverse, pertinent 
expertise and they are less formal and costly.’135 Their diverse make-up may help in drawing 
out the exact nature of the disagreement in cases (is it over facts or values?) and identifying 
possible conflicting values, which is crucial to finding a solution which accommodates  
parental values while still protecting the interests of the child. It may also help to ensure that 
the decision isn’t influenced too heavily by the values of one individual (as it can be by a 
judge), and where the decision does involves committing to one set of values, that these are 
brought out into the open and scrutinised by other committee members.  
Despite this, CECs in England are not currently directed towards resolving complex ethics 
disputes between doctors and parents, but at advising doctors and approving experimental 
treatments. To do this then, they would need to substantially re-orientate (and restructure) 
themselves, in a way that would enable parents to have confidence in their neutrality. Even 
then, Winter’s experiences on a CEC in Canada led to her conclude that:  
Despite our intention to provide a balanced, family-centered approach, the “facts” as presented 
by one clinician and the accompanying arguments had a lot of weight. The members of the CEC 
generally knew, and had collegial regard and respect, for their medical peers. This influenced 
and medicalized our first impression of the cases. The members then tried to understand the 
family’s values, but these were often less clearly articulated as families speak from outside of 
the medical culture and vary in their skill to communicate. The focus of CEC discussions was 
primarily on medical interests and secondarily on the parental motivation in their disagreement 
with the recommended medical course. Even with sincere goals for family-centered care, the 
CEC was under an “umbrella” of a hospital system with professionals focused on medical 
values. In the setting of conflict between medical providers and parents, these medical goals 
often outweighed all other values, including social and psychological well-being.’136  
More fundamentally, while the varied composition and informal processes of committees may 
be useful for resolving disagreements without requiring recourse to the courts, this same 
informality militates against giving them any binding legal authority, given the lack of robust 
and transparent procedures for making decisions. The importance of such ‘formalities’ cannot 
be understated. When a case goes to court, procedural and evidential rules ensure that each 
party has the opportunity to put forward all important evidence in advance of the hearing and 
that both sides have an opportunity to present their case. The child has an independent Guardian 
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appointed to represent their interests; and the judge must give reasons for the decision reached, 
in light of the evidence and legal precedent put before them, in a judgment that is ordinarily 
publicly available and thus open to scrutiny. It is then open to either party to apply to appeal 
the decision, which in Gard, went as high as the European Court of Human Rights. While this 
process may take time, this is an inevitable consequence of reviewing and evaluating a 
substantial body of evidence rigorously and thoughtfully. As Wilkinson et al have noted, the 
legal process provides ‘impartial assessment of the claims of professionals and parents, and 
rigorous evaluation of the evidence and the credibility of expert witnesses.’137 This as Austin 
and Huxtable observe, affords the legal process credibility ‘as a means of decisively settling 
disputes’.138  
That legal procedure is essential to the courts legitimacy as a decision-maker is captured by 
Hazel Genn who argues that procedural rules are important because they ‘guarantee procedural 
fairness, and procedural fairness is important both in its own right and through its link with 
substantive justice’.139 As Genn explains,  
the system of procedure is designed to ensure that judges have all the appropriate evidence 
available so that they can find the material facts and apply the substantive law to those facts. In 
this way, procedural rules reflect a sense of justice. Procedure is the means by which substantive 
rights are enforced.140 
Genn’s point is a powerful one in our context: ‘if substantive justice lies in the correct 
application of legal principles to a factual situation, then procedures that increase the likelihood 
of a correct decision being reached are vital’.141  
Legal processes may also be important for the parties involved and Genn notes a substantial 
body of research in support of this.142 According to this, the value of legal decision-making lies 
in the opportunity for parties to feel heard, the chance to present views and have them influence 
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the outcome, the even-handed treatment of the issues by the court, and simply the courtesy and 
respect with which parties (and their views) are treated).143 
These processes are currently crucially absent from CECs, which Sheila McLean aptly describe 
as a ‘due process wasteland.’144 As well as there being no established procedures in place for 
the submission of evidence and conducting of oral hearings, there is also no requirement to 
publish reasons for the decision, or a process for challenging or appealing their decisions 
(except recourse to the courts). This lack of transparency and absence of any precedent value 
for decisions removes the demand for robust development of principle, which could result in 
highly inconsistent decisions. Of course were the decisions of CECs to be legally binding, more 
rigorous procedures could be introduced. In Texas for example, the Act contains various 
procedural requirements that must be followed for the withdrawal of treatment to be legal, 
including that the family are given 48 hours’ notice about the ethics consultation process,145 
are invited to attend,146 and are provided with a written report of the committee’s findings.147 
Clearly, however, these still fall short of the processes usually involved in bringing a case to 
trial. Indeed it may be something of a paradox that in order to supplant courts, committees 
would need to introduce a degree of formality that would in turn undermine the flexibility that 
makes them so effective at resolving disputes.  
This lack of due process and transparency is not just a structural problem. Rather it 
fundamentally militates against CECs ever having authority to make a legally-binding decision, 
since it goes to core of their legitimacy to make these kinds of decisions. We explained above 
that there is often no one, agreed view of what is ‘best’ for a child,148 which will depend on the 
weight that one ascribes to different interests that a child has, in a way that will inevitably be 
influenced to some extent by the decision-makers own values, beliefs and priorities. However  
once it is accepted that this process can never be entirely value-neutral, then the forum in which 
such determinations are made is crucial. Given the gravity of these decisions — which go to 
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the heart of the value that we as a society place on human life, and when we will consider death 
preferable to continued life — it is essential that these decisions are susceptible to public 
scrutiny and challenge. The very fact that the Gard and Evans cases precipitated such intense 
public debate over who should have the ultimate say and whether the courts were right to deny 
parents the chance of prolonging their child’s life, adds credence to the idea that these decisions 
ought to be made in open forums, with adequate reasons given for them. This is, of course, a 
feature of courts, which generally sit in public and issue judgments, but it is not a feature of 
clinical ethics committees.  
This is not to suggest that CECs do not play a useful role in advising healthcare professionals 
faced with complex ethical decisions and for this, the absence of rigid legal procedures might 
be valuable. Nor is it to suggest that mediation may not be a pathway to achieving consensus 
that enables all involved to avoid the stress of going to court. But it does also suggest that the 
very processes which make litigation slow and cumbersome are also those which afford it the 
legitimacy to make binding legal decisions. While avoiding disagreements escalating has 
undoubted advantages, where an intractable dispute arises which cannot be resolved except by 
the use of an independent arbiter, courts, with their commitment to due process and robust 
reasoning, offer the most legitimate option, especially in the kinds of complex and highly 
contentious value-based disputes seen in Gard, Evans and Raqeeb. In particular, they possess 
three features that have been identified above as crucially lacking from other approaches to 
dispute resolution. Firstly, through ensuring that both parties have the opportunity to present 
their own case (and challenge each others), the court process avoids concerns that one voice 
may be presumptively silenced by the other, in a way that may not promote the child’s welfare. 
Secondly, by appointing a Guardian to advocate for the child, the child’s well-being remains 
at the centre of any dispute — a concern raised by Hui who noted that where disputes have 
been resolved outside of the court system in Hong Kong, there is no one to represent the child’s 
interests. Finally the openness and transparency of courts (and judgments) enables the public 
to scrutinise the decision and the value judgments that underpin it; and, if they disagree with 
these, to challenge them through our democratic processes. This is exemplified by ‘Charlie’s 
Law’ which is currently before Parliament, that arose as a direct consequence of the decisions 
in Gard and Evans.  
 37 
Rather than seeking to avoid disputes coming before the courts therefore, we must instead work 
towards accommodating the value-differences that give rise to disagreements over treatment in 
a respectful and transparent way. As Wilkinson et al aptly capture,  
disagreement is not, in itself, a bad thing. Ethically complex decisions—like those around a 
child's treatment towards the end of life—touch on deeply held questions of value on which 
there can be different reasonable views. Disagreement in medicine is inevitable but conflict 
should not be. What is crucial, then, is how we deal with disagreement.... Diverging views must 
be addressed in a way that is respectful, considered, ethically informed, and compassionate, 
without losing sight of the wellbeing of the child.149 
In our view value-difference can be accommodated within assessments of best interests 
providing judges are sensitive and transparent about the values that necessarily underpin them. 
This sensitivity was exemplified by the decision of the High Court in Raqeeb, in which 
MacDonald J conducted a detailed and balanced evaluation of the multiple factors and interests 
at play, engaging closely with both the religious and cultural perspective of her parents, and 
the arguments made by the hospital in favour of ceasing support and preventing her removal to 
Italy.  However the clarity and transparency with which McDonald J detailed the values at play 
and how they (in his view) interacted, may be the exception rather than the rule. In Evans for 
example,150 the parents similarly wished for their child to be transferred to a respected 
children’s hospital in Italy to undergo a tracheotomy and continued ventilation in accordance 
with their Catholic beliefs, yet Hayden J refused, stating that further treatment would 
compromise ‘Alfie’s future dignity.’151 While the cases might be distinguished on the basis that 
in Evans, unlike in Raqeeb, there was evidence that the child might have been able to 
experience pain,152 nonetheless Hayden J did not engage with the need to encompass different 
value systems within the best interests assessment, nor did he acknowledge that there might be 
space for reasonable disagreement over whether it is better to live a longer life in a profoundly 
disabled condition or to end one’s life ‘prematurely’. In fact, by describing the parents position 
as ‘irreconcilable with Alfie’s best interests’,153 Hayden J implied the opposite: that there is a 
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single, objective answer to what is ‘best’ and the court, and not the parents, were able to discern 
that.  
Even in Raqeeb, it may have been important to the outcome of the decision that the view of 
Tafida’s parents coincided with that of a reputable team of medical practitioners (and indeed, 
the legal position of another Member State of the EU). This leaves open the question of whether 
their views would have been given the same weight if they had been less orthodox. Comments 
by MacDonald J suggests not:  
in this case the court has a contrary view from a centre of paediatric excellence obtained with 
full co-operation of the applicant Trust rather than, as in some recent and unfortunate examples, 
the clandestine involvement of inappropriately qualified foreign medical practitioners.154 
Joe Brierley et al have also questioned whether the same weight is ascribed to all religious 
beliefs, nothing that: 
There is ethical tolerance to values that we are more accustomed to and an overt understanding 
and acceptance of the validity of religiously founded claims, which emanate from the tenets of 
older, more established religions. In our readiness to question minority religions we may not be 
giving them an equal voice and establishing a hierarchy of religions, some of which a secular 
system is prepared to accept and some to challenge.155 
However in a liberal democracy committed to religious freedom and tolerance, it is crucial that 
we leave space for people to disagree. Dominic Wilkinson and Julian Savulescu are right to 
suggest that ‘value-based disagreements are part of living in diverse progressive communities. 
So, in a sense, disagreement is a good thing – it is a sign of a pluralistic and tolerant society’.156 
However the issue goes deeper than this, raising fundamental questions about the nature of the 
citizen’s relationship with the state, and where the boundaries lie between private decisions 
and those the state can control. In the United States context, Joseph Goldstein refers to the 
state’s ‘fundamental constitutional commitment to individual freedom’, arguing that it is in just 
these sort of cases involving disagreements about value that it is right that the US Constitution 
‘dictates abstention from imposing one group’s orthodoxy about health care or truth about the 
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meaning of life or, for that matter, death upon another’.157 Before the UK Supreme Court, 
Richard Gordon QC similarly appealed to English constitutional principles in Gard, when 
arguing that value-differences ought to be accommodated in the law by allowing parents to 
retain decision-making capacity providing they did not expose their child to a risk of significant 
harm. As he put it, 
if the State can, without the highest of justification, intrude into so private an area of human life 
as a joint parental decision made about one’s child’s upbringing, the scope for protection against 
state interference afforded by our most basic constitutional values, as well as by Article 8 
ECHR, is considerably eroded.158  
While the law should allow for value difference, as with many other areas of life, a balance 
must be struck. Just as freedom of speech does not mean the state should not be able to curtail 
any speech (and currently both hate speech and defamatory are examples of constrained 
speech), so too must there be limits on parental decisions. Given that these decisions are other-
regarding (that is, they are made on behalf of vulnerable children), there is good reason to 
constrain them where they are potentially harming to that other. Lady Hale recognised this in 
her support of the best interests approach in Gard,159 and we share her perspective, even though 
we do not agree on the appropriate point at which parental choice yields to the state’s 
perspective. As we have argued elsewhere,160 in our view a  harm-threshold strikes a more 
legitimate balance between allowing for value difference and protecting those who cannot 
protect themselves. But regardless of where we draw that particular line, what we should agree 
on is that it is vitally important that we remain committed to allowing for differences of value 
to the greatest extent that we can if we are to remain true to the liberal democratic values on 
which our laws are built. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
When parents and medics disagree about a child’s treatment, going to court is often regarded 
as a last, desperate option, to be avoided if at all possible. Requesting the court resolve such 
disputes is certainly time-consuming, draining and painful, and so when we see other 
jurisdictions experiencing very little recourse to the courts, there is good reason to ask whether 
we can learn from the experiences of these other countries. Are they doing something we are 
not? However, when one examines the approaches of other countries, it emerges that while 
they are doing things differently, this derives in part from different cultural perspectives on 
who ought to have the dominant voice in such disputes, which would not transpose easily to 
English society. While we can learn from some of the approaches to consensus-building 
elsewhere, where there are good reasons to resist placing the desirability of reaching consensus 
above other principles. Moreover while we may want to expand some use of alternative 
mechanisms for resolving disputes relied on in other countries, such as ethics committees and 
mediation, in the main these approaches ought not to be emulated in England and Wales.  
More importantly, however, what emerges from our analysis is that in many jurisdictions the 
lack of judicial involvement in such cases is achieved by avoiding disputes, through deferring 
or acquiescing to one dominant voice (sometimes doctors, sometimes parents). In our view, 
this risks not only failing to protect the interests of the child, but failing to appreciate the 
importance of facilitating open and robust debate on questions as fundamental as when a child’s 
life ought to be brought to an end. While litigation may be long, costly and adversarial, it does 
at least allow each party space for the refutation of the other’s views on what is best for a child, 
and the wider public the opportunity to scrutinise the value-judgments that underpin these 
decisions. A commitment to a liberal democracy which promotes pluralism and tolerance of 
difference demands that we allow for disagreements on matters of value. This cannot be the 
whole of our approach and we must ensure the most vulnerable in our society are protected. 
But we can achieve this while accepting that there can be reasonable disagreement over 
questions of value and leaving space for these to be respected. 
